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This paper examines the role of prestige bias in shaping academic philosophy, with 
a focus on its demographics. I argue that prestige bias exacerbates the structural 
underrepresentation of minorities in philosophy. It works as a filter against (among 
others) philosophers of color, women philosophers, and philosophers of low socio- 
economic status. As a consequence of prestige bias our judgments of philosophical 
quality become distorted. I outline ways in which prestige bias in philosophy can be 
mitigated.
1. Introduction
In spite of a growing realization that academic philosophy has consistently ex-
hibited a lack of diversity, the profession remains largely white, middle- class, 
male, and Anglophone. Attempts to diversify philosophy, for instance, by intro-
ducing more minority authors in syllabi, have met with mixed success. Thomp-
son, Adleberg, Sims, and Nahmias (2016) found that including more women in 
introductory syllabi did not, on its own, entice more women to major in philoso-
phy. Philosophy students already come to university with preconceived notions 
about what sort of person a philosopher is: University of Sydney female under-
graduates, for example, were both less interested in philosophy and less self- 
confident about their philosophical skills compared to their male peers (Baron, 
Dougherty, & Miller 2015).
Several psychological factors might contribute to this lack of diversity, in-
cluding implicit bias and stereotype threat (see Brownstein & Saul 2016 for 
a review). One underexplored factor is prestige bias, which is widespread in 
academia. In this paper “prestige bias” denotes a preference, all other things 
being equal, for job candidates who have their PhD degree from prestigious 
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institutions. It also denotes a preference for papers in journals that are seen as 
prestigious.
The aim of this paper is to investigate how prestige bias contributes to and 
exacerbates the structural underrepresentation of minorities1 in philosophy, and 
how it amplifies inequalities in access to social and economic resources. Philoso-
phers affected by prestige bias include, but are not limited to, women, African 
American, Hispanic, and other philosophers of color and people of low socio- 
economic status, especially first- generation college graduates.2
Section 2 will examine how prestige bias is at present unchallenged com-
pared to other forms of bias in philosophy. Section 3 looks at the forms prestige 
bias takes in academia, and in philosophy specifically. In Section 4 I consider a 
common defense of relying on prestige: it may be a useful heuristic of quality. 
However, as I will argue in Section 5, using prestige as a proxy for quality ef-
fectively screens out philosophers from underrepresented groups. Because of 
these patterns of exclusion, it is unlikely that prestige would be a reliable mea-
sure of quality. In Section 6, I outline concrete ways in which we can mitigate 
prestige bias.
2. Prestige Bias: An Unchallenged Phenomenon in Philosophy
Philosophers are increasing their efforts to counter sexism, racism, homophobia, 
and other forms of bias that marginalize and exclude members of the profession. 
For example, the Gendered Conference Campaign3 was launched by bloggers 
at Feminist Philosophers to highlight male- only conferences in philosophy. The 
anonymous blog What is it Like to be a Woman in Philosophy4 provides testi-
monies of women in philosophy, including many accounts of gender and sexual 
harassment. The Job Candidate Mentoring Program for Women in Philosophy5 
pairs up female mentors and mentees as a way to mitigate the advantage in 
informal mentoring that many male academic job seekers have. The Cocoon Job- 
1. By minorities, I mean people who are underrepresented in philosophy, especially in com-
parison to their prevalence in the general population. For example, women comprise 50.8% of 
the US population, but only between 21 and 26% of US philosophy faculty members are women 
(Schwitzgebel & Jennings 2017). To give another example, Latinx/Hispanics make up 17.6% of the 
US population, but only 7.8% of APA members in 2016 self- identified as such: http://c.ymcdn.com/
sites/www.apaonline.org/resource/resmgr/data_on_profession/Member_Demo_Chart_FY2016_
rev.pdf
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Market Mentoring Project6 helps mentees with other special job market challeng-
es, such as first- generation college graduates and ethnic minorities. Dialogues 
on Disability7 presents a series of interviews that recount the lived experience 
of disabled philosophers, and draws attention to the systematic underrepresen-
tation and exclusion of disabled philosophers in professional philosophy. The 
Directory of Philosophers from Underrepresented Groups in Philosophy (UP 
Directory)8 provides a database of philosophers who self- identity with a num-
ber of demographics (including Black, with a disability, woman, other gender, 
and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender or Queer). The purpose of this website, 
according to its organizers, is “to provide an easy- to- use resource for anyone 
who wants to learn more about the work of philosophers who belong to under-
represented groups within the discipline.” There are committees of the Ameri-
can Philosophical Association (APA) for women, Asian, African- American, His-
panic, LGBTQ, and indigenous philosophers. This selection of efforts within the 
profession is not meant to be exhaustive but to highlight the fact that some phi-
losophers care about inclusiveness in the discipline.
In all these efforts to increase the discipline’s diversity, prestige bias is rarely 
discussed or directly challenged. This is perhaps due to the large attention im-
plicit bias has received, or active resistance against people who call out bias (see 
Kidd 2017 for an overview). Some authors, such as Bruya (2015), have offered 
methodological criticisms of rankings of philosophical programs, in particular 
of the Philosophical Gourmet Report (PGR), but do not dispute the idea of rank-
ing per se. Their focus is on how the rankings could be improved, but they do 
not seem to think there is anything intrinsically wrong with a ranking system. 
However, as I will argue in the next sections, rankings reflect a bias for prestige, 
and prestige bias can exacerbate inequalities in philosophy.
3. Prestige Bias Is Pervasive
Academics in the US tend to be politically left- leaning: the majority are in favor 
of lessening economic and social inequalities (Gross & Simmons 2014). However, 
this concern for equality of opportunity does not translate itself in faculty hiring 
decisions. Social inequality in academia is glaring. A main criterion for hiring 
appears to be the prestige of the department where candidates complete their 
6. https://sites.google.com/site/cocoonmentoringproject/
7. See, e.g., this interview, with Brian Montgomery. http://philosophycommons.typepad.
com/disability_and_disadvanta/2017/10/dialogues-on-disability-shelley-tremain-interviews-bri 
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doctorate. (There are other ways in which prestige bias manifests itself, such as 
a bias in favor of prestigious journals or for what are perceived as “core topics”, 
which I will briefly discuss in Section 5.2.) In particular, there is a structural lack 
of upward social mobility in hiring practices: someone from a prestigious school 
may end up in a lower- ranked institution, but the reverse is unusual. In phi-
losophy, as in other disciplines, comparably few high- prestige schools generate 
a disproportionate number of tenure- track hires. This advantage of prestigious 
institutions also appears in graduate school admissions, citations, and research 
assessments. The data I will present in this section are correlational and do not, 
by themselves, establish that prestige is driving the hiring decisions. It might 
be that a common factor (e.g., candidate quality) underlies the pattern. In Sec-
tion 4 I will present evidence to suggest that prestige— independent of other 
measures— is driving hiring decisions.
A systematic review of placement data of 19,000 academics in three disci-
plines, computer science, business, and history (Clauset, Arbesman, & Larre-
more 2015) shows that candidates graduating from prestigious schools have a 
substantial advantage on the job market: only 25% of doctoral schools produced 
71– 86% of all tenure- track faculty in these fields. Upward social mobility was 
especially rare: only 9– 14% of faculty found jobs in institutions that were more 
prestigious than the one that awarded their doctorate. Herlihy- Mera (2015) ob-
serves similar hiring patterns in English departments in the US from 1955 to 
2012. High- ranking universities supplied lower- ranking ones with plenty of can-
didates, but they did not reciprocally hire from these schools: 72% of all hires 
came from top- 10 departments, but only 1% of hires in top- 10 departments are 
PhD holders from lower- ranked schools. Moreover, the top- 10 departments 
mostly hire candidates from similarly prestigious universities. Overall, 50% of 
appointments in this field came from just 3% of institutions.
Do we observe similar dynamics in philosophy? I examined hiring data from 
the past 5 years (2012– 2017), obtained by Carolyn Dicey Jennings and colleagues 
through their Academic Placement Data and Analysis project9  to find out wheth-
er prestige of the department that awarded the PhD influences hiring. I use the 
PGR as a measure of prestige. In the PGR, a select number of judges (mostly 
from elite institutions in the US and the UK) rank philosophy departments with 
graduate programs in the English- speaking world “on the basis of the quality of 
faculty.”10  Note that by its focus on Anglophone departments, the PGR does not 
include institutions in many parts of the world, including continental Europe, 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa. In this way, it may further exacerbate discrimi-
nation against non- native speakers of English, for instance caused by implicit 
9. http://placementdata.com/about/
10. The 2015-2016 PGR was found and retrieved from this address: http://www.philosophi
calgourmet.com/reportdesc.asp. The 2017-2018 version can be found here: http://34.239.13.205/
Prestige Bias: An Obstacle to a Just Academic Philosophy • 263
Ergo • vol. 5, no. 10 • 2018
and explicit biases against people who speak with a foreign accent (see Ayala 
2015 for discussion). Also, with the exception of the National University of Sin-
gapore, African and Asian universities in English- speaking countries are not fea-
tured in the PGR, even though a number of them offer PhDs in Philosophy with 
English as the language of instruction, which further strengthens biases against 
people of color in philosophy.
The PGR provides a good indicator of the relative prestige of philos-
ophy faculties. Its top- ranked schools mostly correspond to departments 
that also do well in other rankings (e.g., Oxford, Princeton, Yale, and Har-
vard); however, there are a few schools, such as Rutgers and Michigan, 
which rank highly in the PGR but not globally.11  To investigate placements 
in philosophy, Jennings et al. requested placement data from department 
chairs and placement officers.12  Their dataset contains a diverse set of un-
ranked and ranked doctoral programs. Examples of unranked participating 
schools include Baylor University, the University of Reading, Boston Uni-
versity, Duquesne University, Emory University, and Fordham University. 
Examples of ranked participating schools include the University of Oxford, 
the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, Princeton Univer-
sity, the University of Toronto, and New York University. If philosophy is 
like other disciplines, we should observe the following patterns. First, one 
would expect that the top- ranked departments supply a very large num-
ber of tenure- track hires. Second, graduates from the most prestigious de-
partments would be hired at all levels, whereas graduates from unranked 
schools tend to cluster at unranked or lowly ranked institutions. I focused 
on tenure- track hires and permanent lectureships (the equivalent junior 
faculty position in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand) in 
the dataset. As I wanted to examine the effects of doctoral prestige, I only 
looked at doctoral departments in countries that are listed in the PGR (the 
US, UK, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia). The resulting dataset of 
hires from 2012 to 201713 (2012– 2017) contains 1260 tenure- track and per-
manent lecturer hires, 1254 of which have information on both hiring de-
partment and origin of the candidate’s doctorate. I first examined whether 
there is a correlation between the mean PGR scores of the hiring and PhD 
granting department. This correlation is statistically significant, r(1258) = 
0.383, p <.001, but only has a medium effect size, probably owing to the fact 
11. The rankings I used were retrieved from http://www.philosophicalgourmet.com/overall.
asp - for the most recent overall rankings, see http://34.239.13.205/index.php/overall-rankings/
12. The most recent hiring data, for 2012– 2017, are available upon request through the e- mail
address provided on the website http://placementdata.com/about/ or can be consulted online.
13. At the time the list was provided to me, June 2017. The total number of tenure track/per-
manent lectureship hires for 2017 was not known then.
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that highly- ranked candidates get hired at departments of different ranks, 
including unranked departments, as we will see shortly.14
I then categorized both the placement and doctoral departments in the fol-
lowing three types: (1) not PGR- ranked, (2) ranked by the PGR, outside the top 
20, and (3) PGR- ranked in the top 20. As can be seen in Table 1, most hires re-
ported in the Academic Placement Data and Analysis project are in unranked 
schools: 976 hires out of a total of 1254, i.e., 77.8%. This is unsurprising, given 
that most schools are unranked. In this time period, top- 20 programs made a to-
tal of 97 tenure track/permanent lecturer hires, 7.7% of the total number of hires. 
The data show that people from unranked schools do get hired: 390 candidates 
(31.1% of all hires) were people without PGR pedigree. However, candidates 
from the top- 20 schools supplied a large number of all hires, 36.8%. Among the 
97 tenure track/permanent lecturer hires in the top- 20 schools, there was only 
one candidate from an unranked school: this candidate had a degree from the 
Catholic University of America (not PGR ranked), and was hired at the Universi-
ty of Notre Dame (PGR rank 17). The overwhelming majority of hired candidates 
(90.7%, N=88) at the PGR top 20 had their PhD degree from another PGR top- 20 
school. Figure 1 visualizes this dynamic: job seekers who have their degrees from 
top- PGR departments get jobs at all ranks, including at unranked departments, 
but the PGR top- 20 institutions mostly hire from similarly ranked departments. 
This is very much in line with findings from other disciplines: lower- ranked de-
partments hire candidates from higher- ranked institutions, but highly- ranked 
departments do not regularly recruit among lower- ranked doctoral schools. The 
situation in philosophy appears to be less elitist than in English, but is still in line 
with a preference for candidates from prestigious schools (prestige bias).
This lack of social mobility may manifest itself before students enter gradu-
ate school. Schwitzgebel (2011) found that philosophy graduate students en-
rolled at Berkeley and Princeton, two PGR top- 20 institutions that published the 
undergraduate pedigree of their graduate students, mainly hail from other PGR- 
ranked universities. Of the 121 graduate student profiles he examined, nearly 
30% came from just eight universities. Only three of the universities from which 
these graduate students got their undergraduate degree were absent from the top 
100 of the US News and World Report rankings, but they were ranked well for 
philosophy (e.g., Rutgers). I looked at a more recent sample, namely the 42 PhD 
students listed at the New York University philosophy department who were 
enrolled in 2017,15  which is currently ranked 1 in the PGR. Of these, 40 had their 
undergraduate or master’s listed on the website or their personal homepage. The 
majority of current NYU PhD students in philosophy (75%) have their earlier de-
14. A linear regression could not be calculated because the residuals did not follow a normal 
distribution.
15. http://as.nyu.edu/philosophy/directory/students.html
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Table 1. Placement of candidates from doctoral departments outside of the PGR, in the PGR 
outside the top-20, and in the PGR top-20 as reported in the Academic Placement Data and 




Placements in  
institutions in the 
PGR outside top 20
Placements in 
institutions in 
the PGR top 20 Totals
Candidates from  
unranked schools
375 14 1 390
Candidates from PGR 
ranked schools outside 
top 20
328 67 8 403
Candidates from PGR 
top 20 ranked schools
273 100 88 461
Totals 976 181 97 1254
Figure 1. Streams of placements from three different kinds of PhD granting 
institutions: PGR top 20 (purple), PGR top 21– 50 (orange), and unranked (green) 
(2012- 2017).
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gree from PGR- ranked departments. These schools include Oxford (32.5%, PGR 
rank 2), Princeton (7.5%, PGR rank 3), and Berkeley (7.5%, PGR rank 11). The un-
ranked departments included foreign schools such as Humboldt University of 
Berlin, Monash University, and the University of Cape Town. More systematic 
research would need to be done to confirm the role of undergraduate depart-
mental prestige to graduate admissions, but these findings indicate an influence.
Prestige bias also plays a role in later career development, such as the evalu-
ation of grant applications and REF (Research Excellence Framework) assess-
ments. The REF is intended to measure the quality of research outputs (papers, 
monographs, etc.) by British faculty members, in order to produce rankings of 
departments by discipline, and to allocate future funding for research. Publi-
cations are awarded between one and four stars, from unclassified to world- 
leading. There are no hard criteria or metrics for the number of stars to award. 
Because the researchers whose work is reviewed are not anonymous and evalu-
ations of research are to some extent subjective, evaluations can become biased. 
Using data that are available in the public domain, Dix (2016) found significant 
bias in evaluations for the REF: prestigious, research- focused institutions, most-
ly from the Russell Group (which are regarded as the most prestigious universi-
ties), benefit from prestige bias at the expense of more teaching- focused, newer 
universities (the so- called post- 92 universities). As Dix writes,
outputs that would appear equivalent based on external citations are 
scored far more highly if it comes from a known ‘good’ institution. In 
terms of money, it suggests that new universities may be awarded up to 
two thirds less research funding than might have received under a blind 
system. (2016)
4. Prestige as a Measure of Quality
One reason for the correlational data presented in the previous section might be 
that prestige tracks quality: candidates who attend prestigious schools could be 
on average of higher quality, and job hires track this quality, rather than prestige 
per se. Perhaps because there would be a correlation between prestige and qual-
ity, departments could justifiably use the former as an indicator for the latter. 
In order for prestige to be a useful indicator of quality, two conditions need to 
be met: first, it needs to be the case that prestige is a reliable indicator of philo-
sophical talent, and second, everyone of equal merit should have equal access to 
prestige (otherwise we might be overlooking meritorious candidates who might 
not have had access to prestigious schools). In this section, I argue that the first 
condition is not met, by showing that it is sometimes the case that there are 
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equally good candidates (on measures other than quality), where the prestigious 
candidate is more likely to be preferred. In Section 5, I will argue against the sec-
ond condition: prestige bias disadvantages some groups of philosophers more 
than others.
To examine how, if at all, prestige might measure quality, it is useful to clar-
ify what quality might mean. At least at the stage of hiring junior candidates, 
quality is not expertise or a proven track record of excellence. If it were, we 
would expect more seasoned candidates with a larger number of publications to 
have greater success on the job market. But in philosophy departments in the US, 
like in other disciplines, there is a preference for hiring relatively inexperienced 
candidates who have just received their PhD or are still in the All But Disserta-
tion (ABD) stage. Among philosophers who obtained their PhDs between 2012 
and 2014 and who managed to obtain tenure- track positions, 42% received their 
offer in the year they graduated (Jennings et al. 2015). More recent placement 
data (Jennings, Cobb, Kallens, & Kyrilov 2017) reveal that the probability of ob-
taining a permanent position decreases over time. There is a 1 in 5 chance to be 
hired while ABD to first year of graduation, 1 in 8 in the second and third year af-
ter graduation, dropping steadily to 1 in 23 seven years after graduation. While 
these figures do not take into account baseline probability rates (people who did 
not get a job right away might have been weaker candidates), it indicates that 
measures of established teaching excellence and publication record only play a 
modest role (at best) in hiring decisions.
Given that students increasingly publish during their graduate studies, one 
might argue that a successful track record of papers has already been estab-
lished by the time candidates go on the market. Unfortunately, the most recent 
placement data (Jennings et al. 2017) do not list the number of publications per 
candidate. Earlier calculations for hiring in 2012 indicate that candidates hired 
in tenure track positions have a median of 2 publications: people from unranked 
departments have more publications than people from ranked departments.16 
The correlation was negative, but small (r = - .17): the lower the rank of the PhD 
granting institution, the more papers in peer- reviewed journals a candidate was 
likely to have (the effect size here is very modest so we cannot draw any firm 
conclusions at this point).
At the stage of being hired in a tenure track position, quality might reflect 
promise or potential. A search committee member might reason as follows “a 
candidate with a PhD from a prestigious university is more likely to develop a 
quality track record”, that is, is a more promising candidate. This quest for po-
tential and promise might be explained by a widespread belief in innate ability 
among professional philosophers. Leslie, Cimpian, Meyer, and Freeland (2015) 
16. http://philosophysmoker.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/to-get-job-in-philosophy.html
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surveyed academics from 30 disciplines in the US to examine whether belief in a 
field- specific aptitude or talent could explain the underrepresentation of women 
and African- Americans. Of the examined disciplines in the social sciences and 
humanities (e.g., sociology, anthropology, and linguistics), philosophy showed 
the highest belief in field- specific ability, measured by agreement to the follow-
ing statement: “Being a top scholar in [philosophy] requires a special aptitude 
that just can’t be taught.” Participating philosophers also tended to believe that 
this attitude was prevalent in their discipline. Such beliefs may play a role in 
hiring decisions, by looking for potential that indicates a special aptitude for 
philosophy, even if that aptitude is not yet realized in the form of an established 
publication record.
However, it is hard to measure potential, or to test whether measures for 
quality in terms of potential are reliable (see also Bright, 2017b). A large body 
of literature from a variety of job sectors, including academic and non- academic 
fields (see Kuncel, Klieger, Connelly, & Ones 2013 for a meta- analysis), suggests 
that holistically measuring quality from job application materials and inter-
views (rather than more quantitative measures) tends to produce poor hiring 
decisions. Once search committees have made a first cut based on minimum 
requirements (e.g., PhD in philosophy, right area of specialization), predicting 
how well someone will fare in their future job based on application materials 
is notably difficult. For instance, 70– 80% of the variation in job performance of 
people hired at senior levels in management is unpredictable at the hiring stage 
(Highhouse 2008).
In retrospect, it is also hard to ascertain whether the hiring decision was cor-
rect. For instance, when potential is not realized, we do not know whether it is 
because a candidate’s quality has changed over time, or whether we were mis-
taken about them (Bright, 2017b). It is also difficult to rely on quality evaluations 
in terms of potential, because they can become a self- fulfilling prophecy. Several 
years after hiring, once a candidate has built up a significant publication record 
and national or even international reputation, it is possible to get some sense of 
whether the candidate’s job performance is good (reflecting some form of qual-
ity). But it is unsurprising that job applicants hired at research- intensive uni-
versities would do well several years down the line. Take Chris and Daryl, who 
both apply for a position at a prestigious research- intensive university. Chris is 
hired; Daryl fails to land a tenure- track position in the same year. Chris obtains a 
2- 2 position that allows for pre- tenure sabbaticals and research leave. Chris has 
research support (e.g., funding for conference travel and books). The university 
regularly hosts major events, including lecture series, colloquia, and conferences, 
featuring renowned and up- and- coming visiting speakers. This helps Chris get 
a good sense of the latest topics of interest in their discipline, and helps them to 
build out an international network. Daryl obtains a one- year Visiting Assistant 
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Professor position at a teaching- intensive school, having to teach eight courses 
per year, followed by a string of other short- term positions, including adjunct-
ships. Daryl lacks funding for conferences or books, office space, and even reli-
able library access. Daryl attempts to improve their publication record, but the 
stresses of successive job applications and relocations eat away at their produc-
tivity. Five years further, Chris is on course to achieve tenure with an impressive 
publication record, while Daryl is struggling, a clear instance of the Matthew 
effect. The Matthew effect describes any form of cumulative advantage (whether 
economic or cultural) that accrues over time, whereby those rich in resources 
tend to accumulate advantages more easily, and those poor in resources face 
increasing difficulties, thus amplifying disparities between resource- rich and 
resource- poor individuals. The related concept of Matthew mechanism (Bask & 
Bask 2015) describes the processes through which this widening gap occurs. Re-
searchers who obtain a tenure- track position while ABD or freshly minted PhD 
have more resources (e.g., in terms of academic support) and fewer stressors 
(e.g., low pay, frequent moves), compared to academics who do not land such 
positions immediately.
Moreover, the few studies that have compared doctoral prestige to other 
measures (e.g., how well the candidate published during graduate school, how 
much their work was cited, and how quickly they submitted their PhD disserta-
tion) found that prestige had only a small effect on future productivity, but a 
large effect on placement (see, for example, Baldi 1995 for a study among so-
ciologists). Given that US academic institutions often have ballpark figures for 
research productivity that are required for tenure, future productivity is an im-
portant consideration for whether or not someone would be a successful hire at 
a tenure track job.17
Taken together, this suggests that it is hard to assess future academic suc-
cess at the stage of hiring, that it is difficult to check whether assessments on 
the basis of candidate quality are correct or a self- fulfilling prophecy due to the 
Matthew effect and mechanism, and that prestige is only a modest predictor of 
future academic productivity. In the light of this, it would seem prudent not 
to rely unreflectively on prestige as a measure of quality. Yet, as we have seen, 
philosophers do rely on prestige in hiring decisions. They do so because it pro-
vides an easy way to whittle down a large pile of applications to a more manage-
17. For example, at Florida State University, a philosopher who comes up for tenure and
promotion to Associate Professor would need something in the order of five refereed articles plus 
two further units, or a published book and two articles, all of sufficient quality and beyond the 
candidate’s PhD dissertation. See here: http://philosophy.fsu.edu/sites/g/files/imported/storage/
original/application/75dc0cd3f63861dc03c87575de5c7945.pdf. Many other institutions have quan-
titative norms, in addition to qualitative norms (i.e., the papers or books need to be of sufficient 
quality, and there need to be at least n of them, with n varying per institution).
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able one. Typical job applicant dossiers in the US contain a cover letter, research 
statement (sometimes also a dissertation abstract), CV, teaching statement, and 
other evidence of teaching competence (such as evaluations and syllabi), a writ-
ing sample, and three letters of reference. In the UK, the file tends to be thinner, 
consisting of a cover letter, CV, writing sample, and contact details of reference 
writers (whose letters are typically only solicited at the shortlisting stage). Sub-
stantial dossiers made sense when the number of applicants for any tenure track 
job was modest by today’s standards. At present, with hundreds of applications 
for most openings, it is impossible for search committee members to read all this 
on top of regular teaching, research, and administrative duties (Herlihy- Mera 
2015: 88). Using the prestige of the doctoral granting department has become 
a practical shortcut. As Marinoff explains the hiring procedure at City College, 
New York (an unranked department):
How did we prune our field from 637 to 27? An important selection cri-
terion was holding a Ph.D. from a good university. Members of our de-
partment earned their Ph.D.s at Columbia, Harvard, Oxford, and Uni-
versity of London. Additionally, City College is known as the “Harvard 
of the Proletariat,” with distinguished alumni that include nine Nobel 
Laureates, more than any other public institution in America. Our faculty 
members are expected to live up to this legacy. (2009)
Quantitative evidence suggests that the prestige of the PhD granting department 
plays a role in hiring decisions independent of other qualities a candidate might 
have. Bedeian, Cavazos, Hunt, and Jauch (2010) looked at a large sample of grad-
uate placements in management and found that the prestige of the doctoral de-
partment interacted with perceived quality of publications. Early career gradu-
ates from top departments tended to get more prestigious initial appointments 
compared to graduates from lower- ranked institutions with equally strong pub-
lication records who entered the job market. This does not indicate that there is 
no correlation between prestige and quality, but it does show that in some cases, 
equally good candidates were treated unequally due to prestige factors.18
 Headworth and Freese (2016) looked at candidate placement in sociology, tak-
ing into account both the prestige of the journals the job candidates published 
in, and the awards they won. After controlling for these two factors, Headworth 
and Freese still found
an enormous association between PhD institution and placement in the 
set of jobs we consider. The over 40% of doctorates who receive their de-
18. Thank you to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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grees from schools in the lowest- prestige tier are entirely absent from the 
most prestigious sociology research jobs and virtually absent even from 
our broader set of all rated jobs. (2016: 1275– 1276)
The first claim is in line with what we have seen for philosophy, where candidates 
from the lowest- prestige universities are absent in the top departments. But the 
second claim does not hold true for philosophy: people from unranked schools 
do land tenure- track jobs. Headworth and Freese (2016) think that prestige of the 
PhD granting university is used as a proxy for quality, trumping factors such as 
publications in prestigious journals and winning prestigious awards.
Prestige is an indicator of social and cultural capital, and might be valued 
for indicating these. By hiring a candidate from a prestigious institution, the 
hiring committee and faculty might hope to get the prestige to rub off on them. 
Building upon conceptual analysis by Bourdieu (1986),19 Burris (2004) investi-
gated prestige in academia as a form of social capital, focusing on sociology, 
history, and political science. Bourdieu (1986; 1988) drew a distinction between 
economic, cultural, and social capital. Economic capital represents one’s eco-
nomic resources (such as property rights and money). Cultural capital consists 
of one’s cultural resources, such as dispositions (etiquette, tastes that are deemed 
appropriate), books and other sources of knowledge, and formal educational 
qualifications. Social capital represents one’s social network and relationships, 
often in the form of membership of a particular social circle— the more exclusive 
and desirable the circle, the more valuable one’s social capital. The latter form of 
capital is concretely expressed in the form of interpersonal relationships, such as 
friendships, marriages, and networks. In the case of academia, this can be a PhD 
from a prestigious university, being hired at a prestigious university, or being 
part of a network of people at prestigious institutions. People may try to con-
vert one form of capital into another. For example, someone can try to put their 
education (cultural capital) to acquire a well- paying job (resulting in economic 
capital), or someone with money but no social standing might want to marry 
into a more established family with high social but little economic capital (e.g., 
impoverished nobility). In spite of being perhaps the least tangible of these capi-
tals, social capital is the most resistant to change. It is protected by exclusive club 
memberships. People who try to get into exclusive social groups are derisively 
referred to as upstarts or social climbers. The fact that social mobility in aca-
demia is mainly downward, not upward can be explained in terms of Bourdieu’s 
(1986) distinction between the types of capital. Lesser- ranked departments are 
“eager to exchange their economic capital (faculty positions and salaries) for 
19. See also Bourdieu’s Homo Academicus (1988), a study of the forms of social and cultural
capital in French academia.
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the increment in prestige they hope to gain by hiring the graduate of a highly 
ranked department” (Burris 2004: 245). The net result is that prestige hierarchies 
are maintained, as highly- ranked department graduates quasi- monopolize em-
ployment. It can explain why rankings remain remarkably stable even as faculty 
members move department or retire. If a department were to lose a large number 
of its prominent faculty members in a short period of time, this might result in a 
shift in social capital and thus affect the ranking. Since faculty moves are limited, 
rankings will be maintained because institutional networks (e.g., who hires from 
whom) tend to transcend individual faculty members. Prestige may also be an 
indicator of cultural capital, as faculty at top departments tend to have a better 
feel for the “rules of the game”, for instance, by submitting more to top journals 
and working more on “core topics” (see Section 5.2 for preliminary empirical 
evidence to support this claim). Such a sensibility for the rules of the game is a 
direct result of moving in the right social circles, and thus of social capital.
This pattern can also be observed in philosophy, where, as we saw, high- 
prestige departments tend to hire primarily from other departments with similar 
high PGR rankings (see Figure 1). While these data do not, by themselves, establish 
causation, it would be very odd that almost no candidates from unranked schools 
were deemed of good enough quality to be hired by a top- 20 department. This is 
at least suggestive of the fact that search committees use departmental prestige 
(independent of other qualities, which may also play a role in varying degrees) 
to guide their hiring decisions. How much it guides hiring decisions depends on 
the schools and what they look for in candidates. For example, teaching- focused 
schools will often request more extensive teaching dossiers and letters of recom-
mendation, teaching awards, and other forms of evidence that speak to a candi-
date’s qualities in the classroom, and put less weight on prestige. For research- 
intensive schools, teaching usually plays a far less prominent role, and prestige 
becomes more important (see, e.g., Kelsky 2015: Chapters 26 and 27, for compari-
sons). To sum up, my analysis in this section is not intended to show that there is 
no correlation whatsoever between prestige and quality— the data do not allow 
one to draw such a strong conclusion. What they do show is that prestige guides 
hiring decisions independently of other features a candidate might have, and that 
the correlation between prestige and quality is unreliable.
5. Prestige Bias Disproportionately Affects Minorities
in Philosophy
Having shown that prestige is not a reliable measure of quality, I will now ex-
amine whether everyone has equal access to it by looking at the effects of pres-
tige bias on minorities in philosophy. Given that rankings of departments (in 
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philosophy and other fields) express social capital, one would expect that such 
departments are populated by people who have the economic, cultural, and so-
cial capital to be part of these networks. This leads to an underrepresentation of 
people who are less well networked in academia.
5.1. Prestige Bias Leads to an Underrepresentation of Ethnic Minorities 
and People of Low Socio- Economic Status in Philosophy
Since the prestige of one’s undergraduate school influences one’s chances of get-
ting into a prestigious graduate school, it is worthwhile examining why eth-
nic minorities, including African American and Asian American students, are 
underrepresented at most American elite institutions. Admission systems tend 
to privilege wealthy white applicants. For instance, Harvard, Yale, Stanford, 
Princeton, and Columbia, which are in the PGR top 20, uphold the practice of 
legacy preferences. Legacy preferences are preferential admissions for the chil-
dren of alumni. Such practices were originally designed to keep Jewish students 
out. As Karabel (2005) details, a focus on academic performance led to an in-
crease of admissions of Jewish students of Eastern European descent in the early 
20th century. To solve this “Jewish problem,” (Karabel 2005: 130) and to prevent 
a “WASP flight” (2005: 134) that would be prompted by what was perceived as 
an unacceptable increase of non- Christian immigrants, a number of prestigious 
universities created a new admission system based on legacy preferences and 
subjective evaluations of character and personality. “By emphasizing the inher-
ently subjective character of admission decisions, the new system of selection 
left the elite colleges free to adapt to changing circumstances by admitting— 
and rejecting— pretty much whomever they wished” (Karabel 2005: 135). As a 
result, the background of freshmen in universities such as Harvard, Yale, and 
Princeton narrowed quickly to include mostly white, wealthy students of WASP 
backgrounds.
While this system was originally designed to keep Jewish students out, it 
now continues to exclude Asian and Asian American students. Since the 1980s, 
empirical evidence consistently shows that Asian Americans outperform all oth-
er ethnicity categories in SAT scores and other relevant measures of academic 
achievement, a difference which seems due to greater academic effort (see, e.g., 
Hsin & Xi 2014; Sue & Okazaki 1990; Zhou & Lee 2014). In spite of this, the odds 
of admission for Asian Americans in prestigious US universities are nearly 30% 
lower than those of white students. Legacy students are about twice as likely 
to be accepted as non- legacy students in prestigious institutions (Espenshade, 
Chung, & Walling 2004). Therefore, some authors (e.g., Mandery 2014) have ar-
gued that legacy preferences perpetuate injustice and should be discontinued.
Other data demonstrate that admission to undergraduate elite institutions 
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(and, by extension, graduate school admission and future professional success) 
is not purely a matter of merit and talent. In 2007, about 15% of freshmen en-
rolled at highly selective US colleges were white teenagers who failed to meet 
their institutions’ minimum admissions standards: some secured a place as ath-
letes; others gained admission due to connections to people important for the 
institutions, in particular donors, faculty members, administrators, and politi-
cians (Schmidt 2007).
But even if athlete studentships and preferential treatment due to social 
capital were to end, and admissions were to be purely based on measurable 
criteria, minorities would still be affected by factors outside of their control. 
The problem is not so much the cost of a tertiary education, since there are 
student loans and scholarships. Rather, gaining admission to a prestigious uni-
versity already requires significant advantages, such as access to good primary 
and secondary education (which, in turn, is sensitive to house prices, or can 
be bought in the form of private education if no satisfactory public school is 
nearby), and access to private tutors and other forms of additional support. 
As Giubilini and Minerva (in press) observe, physiological factors involved 
in cognitive development are highly sensitive to socio- economic status, with 
frequent developmental delays in the frontal and temporal lobes of the most 
economically disadvantaged children (Hair, Hanson, Wolfe, and Pollak 2015). 
Even if children of low socio- economic status overcome all these hurdles and 
do well academically, they are still less likely to end up in elite undergraduate 
and graduate institutions, because of lack of cultural capital: in their cultural 
milieus there is less awareness of the importance of prestige. While in a middle- 
class family, the concern for a child on the cusp of higher education would be 
to get into a “good” school, concerns in working- class families are different: 
getting into university at all is already regarded as an accomplishment. As the 
African American philosopher Tommie Shelby (cited in Phillip 2008) observes, 
“I went to Florida A&M by chance . . . . I’m a first generation college student, 
so no one in my family had really gone and knew the ropes.” The same holds 
true for graduate school: a student from a working- class background does not 
have the same awareness of the importance of the prestige of a graduate school 
as a student from a middle- class background.
Taking together these cultural differences between students from the middle 
class and those from lower socio- economic background, and the extra hurdles 
that especially first- generation college students face, it is unsurprising that only 
14% of students in US prestigious schools come from the lowest socio- economic 
background (Walton Radford 2013). Given the distribution of wealth in the US 
and the UK, those students are disproportionally likely to be people of color, 
including African Americans in the US and Blacks/Caribbeans in the UK. The 
wealth gap between white and African- American and Hispanic people has 
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increased after the 2008 recession, with whites having 12.9 times as much as 
African- Americans in net worth, and 10.3 times as much as Hispanics in 2013 
(Kochhar & Fry 2014). In the UK, a large- scale survey by the Office for National 
Statistics estimated mean net wealth for white households in 2014 at GBP 228,100, 
compared to GBP 24,700 for Blacks of Caribbean ancestry and GBP 15,300 for 
Blacks of African ancestry.20
Given that students from high- prestige schools dominate the job market, we 
are now in a position to explain why, for example, black philosophers, who are 
more likely to come from low socio- economic backgrounds compared to whites, 
are underrepresented in academic philosophy. Botts, Bright, Cherry, Mallaran-
geng, and Spencer (2014) calculated that only about 1.32% of philosophers at US 
universities (at all professional ranks, including graduate students) are black. 
Since about 12.3% of the US population is black, this is a significant underrep-
resentation. In the UK there are about 1.5% students who are of Caribbean heri-
tage, but only 0.5% attend Russell Group universities. Black Africans (3% of the 
UK population) make up 4.4% of total domestic students,21 but comprise just 
2.1% of students attending Russell Group universities (Barn 2014). Barn links 
this differential access to prestigious graduate degrees to the underrepresenta-
tion of Black academics:
In an increasingly competitive academic job market, one’s pedigree in 
the form of university background is highly important, with qualifica-
tions from elite universities serving as Pavlovian indicators of academic 
capability. It seems that young black British people are far less likely to 
attend the UK’s most selective universities, a factor which could be mak-
ing it harder to get academic jobs. (2014)
Looking at publications in prestigious journals, which are important for hiring, 
tenure decisions, promotions, and senior offers, we also see how prestige filters 
out ethnic minorities in philosophy. If African American philosophers published 
proportional to their numbers in the top general journals, one would expect 
them to have authored about 1.3% of the contributions. However, Bright (2016) 
found that in a list of 15 high- prestige philosophy journals (which included both 
general and specialist periodicals) black philosophers only authored 0.28% of 
articles (including book reviews), and only 0.19% of research papers (i.e., 15 pa-




21. This also includes overseas African students. Statistics do not give a breakdown in terms
of domestic versus international black students.
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most prestigious philosophy journals thus also has a negative influence on their 
further chances for career advancement.
5.2. Prestige Bias Leads to Testimonial Smothering and Silencing of 
Philosophical Work outside the Dominant Traditions
Prestige bias can result in testimonial silencing (terminology from Dotson 2011) 
for work in philosophical traditions that is considered fringe or optional, such as 
philosophy of race and non- western philosophy. In testimonial silencing people 
are silenced and not taken seriously as testifiers as a result of their group mem-
bership. There are at least two forms of testimonial silencing: testimonial quiet-
ing and testimonial smothering. As speakers, we have a certain vulnerability 
toward our audience. We cannot force others to listen to what we have to say, so 
any communicative act requires some cooperation on the part of listeners. They 
need to be both willing and capable to receive testimony. Testimonial quieting 
occurs when one fails to recognize the speaker as a knower, which damages a 
speaker’s agency. Search committee members who make a first cut of job ap-
plications on the basis of the prestige of the doctoral department are engaged 
in testimonial quieting. They systematically ignore the testimony of applicants 
who lack the required social capital. It is an injustice that the potential audience 
is not even willing to look at the merits of a candidate, in terms of publication 
record, teaching experience, and other measures merely because she does not 
come from the right school.
Testimonial smothering occurs when a speaker notices that an audience is 
unwilling or unable to take up her testimony and so “smothers” her own testi-
mony. She will then try to insure that “the testimony contains only content for 
which one’s audience demonstrates testimonial competence” (Dotson 2011: 244). 
When graduate students and other jobseekers are unable to secure a place at a 
prestigious graduate school, they might try to compensate for this by changing 
their topics of work to fit more prestigious fields, in order to get into journals 
that are highly prestigious.
The most prestigious journals in philosophy tend to be general journals 
that in principle accept a wide range of papers from different subdisciplines. 
For instance, Colyvan’s22 list of (what he thinks philosophers would consider 
to be) the best journals are Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Philoso-
phy, Mind, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Review, 
and Philosophical Studies. This is in line with other lists, such as Leiter’s 2015 
poll of the top- 20 general philosophy journals. The top 5 in this poll consists of 
Philosophical Review, Noûs, Journal of Philosophy, Mind, and Philosophy and Phe-
22. http://www.colyvan.com/journals.html
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nomenological Research.23  Brooks’s journal rankings for philosophy has the same 
five journals,24 and adds Ethics and Philosophical Quarterly as top- rated journals. 
While these journals are not necessarily the highest in quality, they are regarded 
as the most prestigious. The journals avow themselves generalist, but in practice 
they tend to publish a narrow range of specializations, with a heavy focus on 
analytic philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of 
mind, the so- called “Lemming” subdisciplines. This leaves many areas of phi-
losophy underrepresented in these journals.
Consider Asian philosophy, which offers a large and diverse number of tra-
ditions, including Chinese and Indian philosophies. Olberding (2016) looked at 
abstracts in general philosophy journals, many of which were high- prestige, for 
keywords that one can expect to frequently occur in papers in Asian philosophy: 
“Confucian”, “Buddhist”, “Daoist”, and “Indian.” For each of these journals, 
articles in Asian philosophy were vanishingly rare. Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research was the most fruitful venue, with 19 papers in Asian philosophy 
appearing in the total time period studied (1940– 2014). However, the interest in 
Asian philosophy had tapered off in this journal as the last article appeared in 
1993. Noûs does not have a single article in Asian philosophy in the entire period 
that was under study (1967– 2013). On the whole, the representation of Asian 
philosophy in general journals has flatlined over the years. Although there is 
an increasing body of work in Asian philosophy available to English- speaking 
scholars, with journals such as Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Journal of Indian Phi-
losophy, and Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, this research does not seem 
to find its way into the most prestigious venues.
To examine whether area of specialization might discourage submissions to 
the most prestigious journals, I conducted a survey among academic philoso-
phers (N=251, 76.9% men, see appendix for the questions and more details on the 
survey). I asked respondents if they had submitted to one of the top- 5 general 
journals in philosophy over the past 12 months.25
The majority of respondents (68%) said they did not submit anything to these 
journals during this period.
Philosophers who worked in Lemming subdisciplines (N = 109) submitted 
about twice as much to the top- 5 journals (Mean=.81, SD=1.350), compared to 
scholars who worked outside of these fields (N = 141) (Mean=.45, SD=.906). This 
was a statistically significant difference, following an independent- samples t- 




25. Based on the aforementioned lists, I included the following five journals: Philosophical 
Review, Mind, Journal of Philosophy, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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= 0.31. There was no statistically significant difference in how much Lemmings 
submitted to any refereed journal compared to non- Lemmings, t(249)=1.16, 
p=.248 (NS). Moreover, non- Lemmings submitted more papers to specialist jour-
nals (Mean = 1.86, SD = 1.56) than Lemmings (Mean = 1.07, SD=1.39), t(247)=4.1, p 
< .01, Cohen’s d = 0.53, a medium effect size. These data suggest that Lemmings 
submit more of their work to the top- 5 generalist journals, and people outside 
of Lemming subdisciplines submit more of their work to specialist journals. A 
possible reason, suggested by the open responses to the question of why partici-
pants do not submit to the top prestige journals, is that they are perceived as not 
welcoming to work outside of the Lemming subdisciplines. A number of respon-
dents gave as reason that their work would not fit in these journals, for example:
“My perception is that the areas in which I work (Continental Philoso-
phy, Philosophy of Race, Aesthetics) would not be taken seriously by 
these venues. Why waste time?”
“Many people I’d like to read my papers do not typically read those jour-
nals.”
“I do interdisciplinary work that is more likely to be read by the audience 
I’m most interested in in specialty journals.”
In this way, the prestige of journals leads to testimonial smothering.
5.3. Prestige Bias Leads to an Underrepresentation of Women in 
Prestigious Journals
Does prestige bias play a role in the underrepresentation of women in philoso-
phy? The picture here is less clear- cut than for low socio- economic status phi-
losophers, philosophers from ethnic minorities, and philosophers working in 
non- dominant subdisciplines. Schwitzgebel and Jennings (2017) note that gen-
der disparity in philosophy is still stark, and that the proportion of women in 
philosophy is only slowly rising, but they find mixed evidence for their specific 
hypothesis that gender disparity would be largest for the most prestigious jour-
nals, conferences, and schools. Contrary to their hypothesis, they found that the 
percentage of women faculty members at PGR- ranked departments was similar 
to the percentage of women in the discipline as a whole, and that on average 
women did not receive their PhDs from lower- ranked institutions.
By law, departments in the US can use affirmative action policies in hiring 
and graduate school admission to mitigate the effect of gender bias. This option 
is not available in many other countries. For example, throughout Europe, af-
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firmative action in hiring is illegal. In the UK (following the Equality Act 2010), 
the only thing an employer can do to have a staff that reflects the wider society’s 
diversity is to encourage minorities to apply to job advertisements, and host 
special events for them (e.g., job fairs). An employer can also choose the minor-
ity candidate if two candidates are equally well qualified. Women are under-
represented in the most prestigious UK departments. Research- intensive uni-
versities, such as those of the Russell Group, have fewer women among their 
full professors compared to less prestigious institutions. Only 6 of the 24 Russell 
Group universities have higher than average female representation among the 
professoriate. The BPA/Good Practice Scheme recognizes this, and prompts or-
ganizers of conferences to cast a wider net in order to have a good representation 
of women: “Women may well be at lower- prestige institutions and/or in lower- 
ranked jobs . . . . They may therefore have less access to institutional funding.”26
Given the importance of publications in top journals for promotion, senior 
offers, and increasingly also for junior employment, I will also briefly consider 
how prestige and gender interact in journal publications. Schwitzgebel and Jen-
nings (2017) found that women were less likely to publish in the top- 3 general 
philosophy journals (Philosophical Review, Journal of Philosophy, Mind), and in the 
top specialist journals for ethics (Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs). Only 12% 
of authors in these journals in the period 2013– 2015 were women, which is sub-
stantially below the percentage of women in the profession (around 21– 26%). A 
recent study (Wilhelm, Conklin, and Hassoun in press) widened the sample to 25 
prestigious journals as ranked by the PGR (2015) for 2004 and 2014– 2015. Again, 
the percentage of women in these journals was very low, 14– 16%, substantially 
below the percentage of women at US philosophy faculties. It is currently not 
known whether this underrepresentation of women in the most prestigious jour-
nals is due to lower acceptance rates or lower submission rates, due to a lack of 
information about submission rates. Perhaps the underrepresentation of women 
in prestigious journals can be explained by lower submission rates. This is not 
unproblematic, as it would suggest that prestige acts as a barrier for women to 
submit work to the most prestigious journals.27  Journal prestige plays an impor-
tant role in evaluations of CVs, especially for tenure and promotion decisions, 
and for grant applications, where CV and prior experience play an important 
role in the decision process.
26. Guidelines can be found, for instance, at the British Society of Aesthetics, which provides
grants for conferences. One condition of the grants is that organizers of conferences abide by the 
BPA/SWIP good practice scheme: http://british-aesthetics.org/?portfolio=small-grants.
27. Indeed, several studies (reviewed in Bright 2017a: Section 2) suggest that women in the
sciences believe that their work will be held to a greater standard and face more negative scrutiny 
compared to that of male authors. If this is also true for philosophy, it could explain why women 
submit fewer papers to high- prestige journals.
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Healy (2013) found that women were not only underrepresented in the most 
prestigious philosophy journals, but also undercited. He looked at the most cited 
authors in the top- 4 general philosophy journals, Philosophical Review, Journal 
of Philosophy, Mind, and Noûs. He examined 2200 articles over the past two de-
cades, having a total of 34,000 citations, and focused on papers that have at least 
10 citations. This brought to light intricate citation networks, from which wom-
en were systematically excluded. Of the most highly- cited papers (N=520), only 
3.6% were by women. Healy (2015) further found that this disparity was due to 
a large difference in citation rates of the most highly- cited papers, with highly- 
cited male authors being more cited than highly- cited female authors. While 
having highly- cited papers in top journals is surely a mark of prestige, one may 
wonder whether being part of these citation networks matters given how few 
philosophers publish in these highly- ranked journals, and how few of them are 
cited at all (most philosophy papers are never cited). However, as Healy (2015) 
points out, the most highly- cited papers at top journals (i.e., the most prestigious 
papers) tend to shape the field by being studied by graduate students and end-
ing up in philosophy syllabi. Thus, at a very visible level of prestige, women are 
suffering from prestige bias. This has downstream effects on syllabi and on the 
further engagement with women authors in the field.
6. How to Mitigate Prestige Bias
Having made the case that prestige bias is an obstacle to a more inclusive and 
diverse philosophy, I will now look at concrete ways to mitigate its effects. As 
we have seen, prestige bias already has an adverse effect on diversity at the un-
dergraduate level. In order to counter prestige bias, a wide range of measures 
would need to be introduced, including improving primary and secondary 
schools, extra- curricular support for children from lower economic status house-
holds, and axing legacy preferences and other college admissions systems that 
unfairly privilege white, wealthy students. Such extensive policy changes are 
not easy to implement by individual academics. Nevertheless, there are concrete 
steps we can take to mitigate prestige bias. I will propose the following three: 
correct for prestige bias in one’s citation practices and syllabi, diminish prestige 
bias in graduate school admissions, and counter prestige bias in hiring decisions.
Compared to many other disciplines, including other humanities, philoso-
phers tend to cite fewer authors. In such a climate, citations are in danger of be-
coming a commodity, a favor to be bestowed, presumably in exchange for other 
goods.28 Citing sparingly also makes it more difficult for newcomers in the field 
28. The earlier- mentioned citation networks (Healy 2013) are a clear illustration of this.
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to get a grasp of the literature (Schliesser 2015). Citing more generously may be 
a way to counter this: more citations make citations less of an exchange com-
modity and mean that papers become more accessible to newcomers. Individual 
philosophers could also cite more mindfully, taking care to cite minority authors 
who have substantially contributed to a debate, even if this means citing papers 
published in less prestigious venues. Something analogous to the Bechdel test 
could work (De Cruz 2014). If one is worried about underrepresenting women, 
one could use the simple rule of thumb that one’s paper cites at least two women 
authors, actively engages with at least one woman author (i.e., not just citing 
but engaging with her work), and does not solely mention women because they 
write about a male philosopher.29 One could use analogous rules for other mi-
norities.
Next to citation practices, philosophers can take an active role in reducing 
prestige bias when vetting graduate school applications. For instance, in 2015 
Pennsylvania State University awarded PhDs to five black, female philosophers, 
which is an unusually high number given the low representation of African 
Americans in philosophy, especially women. Robert Bernasconi, who was in-
volved in the admission process, argues that his attempts to diversify were suc-
cessful in part because they actively tried to counteract prestige bias:
Philosophy doctoral programs, and doctoral programs in general, pay 
too much attention to a student’s résumé and academic pedigree, an at-
titude that perpetuates privilege. The question he [Bernasconi] asks him-
self while reviewing applications is: With five years of intensive prepa-
ration, will the student be as good as any other new Ph.D.? “I read the 
writing samples very carefully,” he says, “I’m looking for a spark, some-
thing that suggests insight.” (Patel 2016)
Philosophers can also choose to decrease prestige bias in their hiring decisions. 
Recently, two philosophy faculties (Sheffield, UK and Miami, US) aimed to re-
duce bias in their hiring by anonymizing applicants in the early stages of the 
search and by changing the weight placed on different parts of the application. 
Both departments used anonymous CVs. Note that markers of prestige were not 
omitted from the applications: the anonymized CVs still contained the doctoral 
29. The original Bechdel test is about works of fiction and a work passes the test if it (1) fea-
tures at least two women, (2) who talk to each other, (3) about something other than a man. I am 
grateful to David Chalmers for proposing the third element of the philosophy paper Bechdel test; 
I think the third element is defeasible in areas such as history of philosophy, where the baseline 
rate of philosophers discussing male authors is very high. However, even there, a philosopher 
could take care to cite women in the secondary literature, e.g., for Kant scholars, Onora O’Neill, 
Jill Buroker, or Lisa Shabel.
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school where the candidate graduated, and the names of journals in which the 
candidate published. The aim of these searches was not specifically to reduce 
prestige bias, but rather to reduce bias overall. Jennifer Saul (Sheffield, personal 
communication) explained how her department cut down a list of about 150 ap-
plications. Instead of making a ranking of candidates, search committee members 
looked at anonymized CVs and asked if they met two criteria: whether the appli-
cant could teach in the relevant areas and whether they had a publication record 
that made them look suitable for the next REF. On the basis of these criteria, they 
retained 20 candidates. This procedure is less holistic than the typical search, and 
thus reduces bias overall. Members of the search committee subsequently read 
writing samples and created a shortlist. Letters of reference hardly played a role, 
which may have mitigated the bias in favor of famous letter writers.
Miami had 600 anonymous applications; the department distributed anony-
mized writing samples of all applicants to external referees. On the basis of these 
referee reports, they created a long list of 20 candidates. They held Skype inter-
views and looked at letters of reference (mainly to spot potential problems with 
candidates). After these interviews, they invited a few interviewees to campus. 
While this process did not eradicate prestige bias, it did decrease it (particularly 
in the early stages as the writing samples were anonymized). As Berit Brogaard 
(Miami, personal communication) writes, “We did end up hiring someone with 
a PhD from a German university, which may not have happened if we had not 
gone anonymous.” In both searches, prestige bias was not completely eliminat-
ed, but it was made less salient than it would otherwise be, given the reduced 
importance of letter writers and the use of non- prestige criteria (writing samples, 
publication record, and teaching competence) as deciding factors. Citation prac-
tices, graduate school admissions and hiring practices indicate that individual 
philosophers can go some way to mitigate prestige bias, and hence create a fairer 
playing field for the discipline.
7. Concluding Remarks
Not many philosophers object to the role of prestige in their discipline in mak-
ing hiring and promotion decisions, and in deciding who and what to cite. As 
I have shown, prestige bias generates and exacerbates different forms of in-
equality in philosophy and facilitates exclusion of minorities, including ethnic 
minorities, women, and philosophers who work outside of dominant tradi-
tions. I have argued that prestige bias is harmful, in part, because it dispropor-
tionately affects minorities. Assuming that checks and balances were somehow 
in place to guard against this, would this make prestige bias acceptable? Pre-
sumably not, because of prestige bias’ inability to track what it allegedly tracks 
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(quality, philosophical talent), and its arbitrary preference for some philoso-
phers over others. I have centered my argument on the exclusion of minorities, 
because it is something philosophers seem to be nearly unanimous in seeing as 
a bad feature of the profession.
Prestige bias is both the first and the final hurdle to make academic phi-
losophy more inclusive. It is the first hurdle because countering it provides a 
wide- reaching way to make philosophy more diverse even if we did not make 
any other efforts to increase diversity. By actively countering prestige bias in 
our assessment of doctorate- granting institutions, journals, topics to work on, 
and authors to cite, we can get diversity on the cheap. We can cast a wider net in 
recruiting and retaining young philosophers, and many philosophical ideas can 
flourish. Prestige bias is also the final hurdle, because it has been relatively un-
challenged compared to other biases. I have shown that individual philosophers 
can mitigate prestige bias through relatively simple adjustments in their citation 
practices, graduate school admissions, and hiring processes.
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Appendix: Questionnaire and Methodology Used for Survey on 
Who Submits to Top 5 Journals
Survey conducted September 2014, spread via philosophy blogs and mailing lists.
1. In your estimation, since September 2013, how many papers in total did
you submit to any of the following: Philosophical Review, Journal of Philoso-
phy, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Mind? Do not include
resubmissions, only original submissions in your count.
2. (If answer is 0) Why did you not submit to any of these journals? (select
all that apply) The review time is too long/The probability of acceptance is
too low/The journal I wanted to submit to didn’t accept new submissions/
The papers I wrote during that period do not fit in these journals/ Other
reasons (please explain briefly)
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 3.  In your estimation, since September 2013, how many papers did you sub-
mit to any refereed journal (philosophical or otherwise)? This does not 
include resubmissions, but only original papers. 
 4.  In your estimation, since September 2013, how many papers did you sub-
mit to specialist journals? This does not include resubmissions, but only 
original papers. 
 5. What is your gender? (Male/female/other)
 6. How would you describe your institution? (please select all that apply) 
(public/ private/small liberal arts college/R- 1 (research oriented)/ranked 
in the PGR top 15/ Ivy League (in US) or similar status outside of US/ 
Teaching- oriented/focused/I do not have an institutional affiliation)
 7.  What is your academic position? (Graduate student, tenure- track faculty, 
tenured faculty, non- TT faculty, adjunct or other part- time teaching posi-
tion, non- academic, unemployed)
 8.  What is your ethnic identity? (White, African- American or Black, Asian, 
Hispanic, Mixed, Other)
 9.  What are your areas of specialization (select all that apply)? (list of aca-
demic specializations, e.g., epistemology, philosophy of language, philos-
ophy of race, other)
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